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Introduction
Exploring the link between shifting power and variation in a 
state’s foreign policy has long been central to the study of 
international relations. However, it has also become a ques-
tion of increased political importance as policy-makers in the 
United States grapple with fears of decreasing international 
influence caused by the economic and military growth of 
great power competitors. Scholarship exploring this topic has 
been deeply divided, with prominent scholars such as Brooks 
et al. (2013), Copeland (2000), and Gilpin (1983) suggesting 
that a strategy of retrenchment will leave declining states less 
safe and less prosperous and Copeland (2000) and Gilpin 
(1983) contending that retrenchment will open a declining 
state up to predation and imperil their security. On the other 
hand, scholars such as Layne (2009, 2012), MacDonald and 
Parent (2011), and Posen (2013) suggest that retrenchment 
will lead to a more secure and prosperous America.
Although there has been intense theoretical debate regard-
ing the benefits and costs of retrenchment, these theories have 
only been tested on a handful of cases with various degrees of 
methodological rigor. Work by MacDonald and Parent (2011) 
represents one notable exception as they base their findings 
on a cross-case analysis of all major powers over the same 
time span that we analyze. However, their analysis is limited 
in its ability to control for confounding factors that may affect 
the success of strategies of retrenchment. We build on this 
work by testing these arguments on a time-series cross- 
sectional dataset of all major powers that stretches from 1870 
to the present. Scholars have often pointed to the United 
Kingdom’s successful policy of retrenchment following 
World War II as a rare exception to an otherwise bleak record 
(Gilpin, 1983). Our findings suggest that retrenchment is gen-
erally effective, making states more likely to recover their 
previous power and less likely to experience the most danger-
ous interstate conflicts.
We propose two hypotheses that directly test two of the 
most contentious claims in the literature.
H1: When in a period of decline, a state that chooses to 
retrench will be more likely to recover their previous 
position than a state that does not.
H2: A great power experiencing a period of decline will 
be less likely to be the target of predation at the hands of 
fellow states than a great power that does not.
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Research design
We test our argument on a sample comprising all states 
identified as great powers by the Correlates of War (COW) 
project from 1870 to 2007. This specific time-span is ana-
lyzed due to data availability.1 States enter the dataset in 
1870 or the first year thereafter in which they achieve great 
power status and exit the dataset when they lose their great 
power status for the last time. The full list of countries and 
years included in the data is provided in Table 1.
To operationalize relative power, we follow MacDonald 
and Parent (2011) in constructing an ordinal ranking of all 
great powers in a given year. States are ranked according to 
their overall share of gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita among great powers. This is preferable to measures 
of absolute power, such as overall capabilities, that do not 
allow us to capture the relational nature of our theory. States 
can experience relative decline because their own eco-
nomic performance is poor, or because other states are sim-
ply advancing faster than they are.2
States are coded as entering a period of relative decline 
when they lose at least one rank in a given year. States exit 
a period of decline, or recover, when they regain at least 
one ordinal rank after they enter a period of decline. In our 
view, partial recoveries that reverse the process of decline 
without restoring a state to its full previous rank still indi-
cate successful retrenchment. We also believe that states 
should maintain their improved ranking for some minimum 
period of time. States that regain a rank but immediately 
lose it again have not successfully recovered. Since we 
have no strong theoretical priors regarding how long this 
period should be, we use two different thresholds and pre-
sent results for both. One requires a state to maintain their 
improved ranking for at least one year after recovery, and 
the other requires states to maintain their ranking for five 
years. Once states recover, they become “at risk” of experi-
encing another period of decline.
To operationalize retrenchment, we use the percentage 
change in a state’s military expenditures over the previous 
year as a proxy for its military posture. Whether they are 
drawing down foreign commitments or decreasing mili-
tary investment at home, states engaged in a strategy of 
retrenchment should display declining military expendi-
tures. This provides a continuous measure that allows us 
to capture both whether a state retrenches and the degree 
to which it does so. Data on military expenditures come 
from the COW project’s National Military Capabilities 
Dataset and are measured in nominal values (Lemke and 
Reed, 1998).3 Because we do not have reliable data on the 
inflation rate for military capabilities, we choose not to 
adjust these values for inflation. This decision should be 
inconsequential for our results, since we care more about 
yearly changes in military expenditures rather than their 
absolute level.4
We include several control variables to ensure that our 
models capture the effects of adopting a strategy of 
retrenchment rather than changes in latent military capa-
bilities. To control for the effects of a state’s absolute power, 
independent of its position relative to other states, we 
include the absolute level of GDP per capita. We also 
include the change in GDP per capita over the previous 
year to control for abrupt changes in absolute power.
We also control for factors that may affect a state’s abil-
ity to retrench effectively. First, states with strong alliance 
portfolios should have an easier time retrenching by relying 
on allies to take up the slack in managing international 
security threats. We control for this using the S alliance 
score measure, which provides a measure of alliance port-
folio strength relative to the system leader (Small and 
Singer, 1969). Second, states capable of nuclear deterrence 
may be able to reduce military spending more easily by cut-
ting conventional capabilities. We control for this using 
data on nuclear weapons status from Jo and Gartzke (2007). 
Third, regime type may have an effect on a state’s ability to 
retrench. Because autocracies possess less veto players, we 
expect that they may be able to adjust their spending priori-
ties more easily. In addition, since well-consolidated 
regimes of either type may be more capable of adjusting 
state policy than anocracies, regime type may have a curvi-
linear effect on our variables. To account for this, we 
include both the state’s Polity2 score and its square using 
data from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 
2002).5 To avoid the possibility of simultaneity bias, we lag 
our independent variables and the control variables account-
ing for power by one year in all models.
Recovery models
H1 predicts that states in periods of decline are more likely 
to recover their previous status if they retrench. To test this, 
we use discrete time duration models to estimate the prob-
ability that a state in a period of decline recovers in a given 
year. The dependent variable for these models is our binary 
indicator of Recovery. For each version of our Recovery 
variable (1 year and 5 year), we estimate binomial logit 
models on the subset of the data for all years in which a 
state is coded as in decline. We model the change in the 
Table 1. Countries included in sample.
Great powers Years in dataset
Austria-Hungary 1870–1918
China 1950–2007
France 1870–2007
Germany (including West Germany) 1870–2007
Italy 1870–1943
Japan 1895–2007
Russia (including the Soviet Union) 1870–2007
The United Kingdom 1870–2007
The United States 1898–2007
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probability of failure as a function of time using cubic poly-
nomials of the time since the beginning of the period of 
decline (Carter and Signorino, 2010). Because some coun-
tries never experience decline, both sets of models omit 
observations on some countries.
We begin by discussing the results of our models that 
employ the one year recovery threshold (see Table 2). 
Model 1 estimates the probability of recovery solely as a 
function of a state’s change in military expenditures. 
Model 2 introduces the control variables discussed above, 
and Model 3 introduces fixed effects for each country 
(i.e., unit-specific intercepts) to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity induced by including repeated measures on 
the same units. Taken together, these results provide mod-
est support for the argument that retrenchment helps a 
state recover their previous standing during periods of 
decline. Although the coefficient on changes in military 
expenditures is insignificant in Model 1 and 2, controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity in Model 3 reveals that 
increases in military expenditures have a negative and 
significant effect (at the 0.1 level) on the probability of 
recovery. Put otherwise, states that decrease their military 
spending in a given year are less likely to experience 
recovery in the following year.
To illustrate the substantive significance of this effect, 
Figure 1 plots the predicted probability of recovery as a 
function of changes in military expenditures with all other 
variables held at their observed values. The probability of 
recovery is highest after states make significant cuts in their 
military spending. This probability steadily decreases from 
0.239 to 0.018 at the high end of military expenditures, 
indicating that states which make sharp increases in their 
military spending have almost no chance of recovery.
Table 3 presents the results of our models using the five 
year recovery threshold. Although the coefficients are in 
the predicted direction, our military expenditures variable 
is not significant in any of the three models. In addition, 
including fixed effects in the model requires dropping a 
number of cases, since several states never experience our 
more restrictive coding of recovery. As such, it is difficult 
to draw firm conclusions on the basis of these models. In 
sum, we find some evidence that retrenchment facilitates 
recovery, although this is sensitive to both measurement 
and model specification.
Predation models
H2 predicts that states in periods of decline may be subject 
to increased attacks by enemy states. To test this argument, 
we use binomial logistic regression to model the probability 
that a great power is attacked by another state. Our depend-
ent variable is a measure of whether another state initiated a 
militarized interstate dispute (MID) against a state in a given 
year (Palmer et al., 2015). Because we care about whether 
other states actually attack declining great powers, we 
restrict our analysis to MIDs that involve fatalities. Our pri-
mary independent variables are our indicator of whether a 
Table 2. Effects of retrenchment on recovery (one year 
threshold).
(1) (2) (3)
Military −0.005 −0.036 −0.059*
Expenditures (percentage 
change)
(0.044) (0.040) (0.033)
Gross domestic product 
(GDP)/capita
0.014 −0.339
(0.317) (0.292)
GDP/capita (percentage −0.024* −0.039**
change) (0.014) (0.018)
Alliance strength 0.397 2.335
 (1.122) (1.474)
Nuclear weapons −1.215 0.263
State (1.169) (1.830)
Polity score 0.047 0.054
 (0.043) (0.111)
Polity score squared −0.017** −0.026**
 (0.009) (0.013)
Years in decline 0.365** 0.449** 0.828**
 (0.060) (0.132) (0.206)
Years in decline −0.024** −0.027** −0.039**
squared (0.004) (0.010) (0.011)
Years in decline 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
cubed (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant −3.360** −3.198 −3.821
 (0.257) (2.702) (2.621)
Observations 359 332 332
Country fixed effects No No Yes
Countries 8 8 8
Log likelihood –86.93 –75.60 –65.86
Akaike information criterion 183.87 165.20 145.73
Entries are logit coefficients, with standard errors clustered by country 
in parentheses. Fixed effects have been omitted to save space. *p < 0.10; 
**p < 0.05, two-tailed tests.
Figure 1. Effect of change in military expenditures on 
recovery.
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state is in decline and our measure of retrenchment. Since 
the choice of recovery threshold determines how long a state 
is coded as in decline, we run models using both our one 
year and five year coding schemes. We present the models 
using our one year threshold here. Models using the five 
year threshold are included in the Supplementary Online 
Appendix. These models include the same control variables 
discussed in the previous section as well as cubic polynomi-
als of the number of years since the last MID initiation.
Table 4 presents the results of these models. Model 1 
includes only our measures of decline and retrenchment, 
Model 2 introduces control variables, and Model 3 intro-
duces fixed effects for each country year. Our results pro-
vide modest support for the argument that states 
experiencing relative decline are subject to opportunistic 
attacks by challengers. Although this effect does not reach 
conventional levels of statistical significance in Model 1, it 
becomes significant after introducing control variables 
(Model 2) and fixed effects (Model 3). Holding all other 
variables constant at their observed values, the predicted 
probability of fatal MID onset in a given year is 0.063 for 
states in periods of decline and 0.031 for states that are not. 
As such, great powers in periods of decline are effectively 
twice as likely to be attacked by another state in a given 
year. This provides support for the argument that great 
powers may be subject to opportunistic attacks by challeng-
ers during periods of weakness.
We also find modest support for the proposition that 
great powers that retrench may be able to avoid predatory 
attacks by challengers. The coefficient for change in mili-
tary expenditures is positive and significant at the 0.1 level 
in two of our three models. This indicates that increases in 
military spending are associated with an increased risk of 
predatory attacks. This effect is also substantively signifi-
cant. To provide some intuition of the size of the effect, 
Figure 2 plots the predicted probability of fatal MID onset 
using Model 3 across the observed range of our 
Retrenchment variable with all other variables held at their 
Table 3. Effects of retrenchment on recovery (five year 
threshold).
(1) (2) (3)
Military −0.095 −0.059 −0.067
Expenditures (percentage 
change)
(0.097) (0.071) (0.130)
Gross domestic product 
(GDP)/capita 
−0.152 −0.721
(0.820) (2.135)
GDP/capita (percentage −0.054 −0.055
change) (0.059) (0.091)
Alliance strength −1.010 12.669*
 (1.612) (6.532)
Nuclear weapons 0.061 5.966**
State (1.265) (1.615)
Polity score 0.128 0.023
 (0.143) (0.084)
Polity score squared −0.020 −0.032
 (0.019) (0.020)
Years in decline −0.061 −0.049 0.732**
 (0.087) (0.097) (0.300)
Years in decline 0.001 0.001 −0.028**
squared (0.002) (0.002) (0.013)
Years in decline −0.000 −0.000 0.000**
cubed (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant −3.782** −1.444 −15.504
 (0.430) (5.599) (21.676)
Country fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 643 610 289
Countries 8 8 4
Log likelihood −32.918 −30.884 −20.078
Akaike information criterion 75.84 75.77 46.16
Entries are logit coefficients, with standard errors clustered by country 
in parentheses. Fixed effects have been omitted to save space. *p < 0.10; 
**p < 0.05, two-tailed tests.
Table 4. Effects of decline and retrenchment on fatal 
militarized interstate dispute onset.
(1) (2) (3)
Relative decline 0.452 0.775** 0.786**
 (0.349) (0.247) (0.247)
Military 0.045* 0.041 0.052*
Expenditures (percentage 
change)
(0.025) (0.036) (0.031)
Gross domestic product 
(GDP)/capita 
1.044** 1.040**
(0.229) (0.312)
GDP/capita (percentage −0.015 −0.011
change) (0.012) (0.011)
Alliance strength 0.959 0.215
 (1.138) (1.358)
Nuclear weapons −0.449 −0.871*
State (0.338) (0.478)
Polity score −0.025 −0.086**
 (0.030) (0.042)
Polity score squared 0.000 −0.010
 (0.006) (0.008)
Peace years −0.242** −0.254**
 (0.098) (0.122)
Peace years squared 0.021** 0.021**
 (0.007) (0.009)
Peace years cubed −0.000** −0.000**
 (0.000) (0.000)
Constant −3.552** −12.818** −12.365**
 (0.319) (2.013) (2.991)
Observations 944 905 804
Country fixed effects No No Yes
Countries 9 9 7
Log likelihood −141.611 −126.128 −120.350
Akaike information criterion 289.22 268.26 252.70
Entries are logit coefficients, with standard errors clustered by country 
in parentheses. Fixed effects have been omitted to save space. *p < 0.10; 
**p < 0.05, two-tailed tests.
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observed values. The predicted probability of fatal MID 
onset increases from 0.008 at the minimum to 0.146 at its 
maximum. This provides modest support for the position of 
retrenchment optimists. Although great powers do appear 
to be subject to attack during periods of relative decline, 
our results suggest that states that decrease their military 
expenditures may be less prone to this type of behavior.
On the whole, our results are relatively robust. In gen-
eral, the predicted values of both sets of models track well 
with the observed data.6 Both our models of recovery and 
predation are robust to changes in the coding of our decline 
variable using both one and five year thresholds for our 
recovery variable. However, our results are somewhat sen-
sitive to measurement and model specification, which 
points to the need for further testing before drawing firm 
conclusions. In particular, the fixed effects model performs 
well in all of our analyses. We believe this is the theoreti-
cally most appropriate model, since it controls for unit-
effects and corrects for the violations of the assumption that 
observations are measured independently. Nonetheless, this 
speaks to the need for further testing before drawing firm 
conclusions on the basis of our results. Additional studies 
that employ alternate measures of power and retrenchment 
would be especially useful in this regard.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have assessed the outcomes of great power 
retrenchment using a dataset of all great powers from 
1870–2007. Counter to the expectations of the skeptics, we 
have found that retrenchment has led to relatively success-
ful outcomes. Declining states that choose to retrench expe-
rience shorter periods of relative economic decline and are 
less likely to be the targets of predation than declining 
states that choose not to retrench. While these findings are 
suggestive, more research needs to be done to fully assess 
the outcomes of retrenchment. Among other topics, future 
work should explore the impact that retrenchment has on 
the credibility of the international commitments that the 
declining state chooses to maintain. Additionally, our data 
contain a number of instances of declining states that chose 
not to retrench and subsequently experienced prolonged 
economic problems and predation. Our findings suggest 
that retrenchment would have mitigated some of the nega-
tive effects of decline. Of these cases, post-World War II 
France represents and interesting instance of a declining 
power that chose not to retrench (Spruyt, 2005). Future 
research should employ quantitative counterfactual analy-
ses, such as synthetic control, to explore how retrenchment 
could have changed France’s fortunes.
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Notes
1. 1870 is the earliest year for which reliable gross national 
product data are available for most of the countries in our 
sample. 2007 is the latest year covered by the National 
Military Capabilities Data.
2. Our data come from MacDonald and Parent (2011), who 
construct an updated version of Angus Maddison’s (1995) 
data using Maddison’s industry of origin method to fill in 
missing observations. Gross domestic product is measured in 
real values in millions of 1990 international Geary–Khamis 
dollars. Additional missing data have been imputed using 
draws from a multivariate normal distribution.
3. Military expenditures are measured in British pounds from 
1870–1913 and US dollars afterwards. Because we care about 
relative differences in military spending rather than overall 
levels, this change should not substantially affect our results.
4. Since our measure of gross domestic product (GDP) per cap-
ita is adjusted for inflation and our military expenditures data 
are not, we choose not to normalize military expenditures 
according to GDP. This should not influence our results, 
since we care about changes in a state’s military posture, not 
the overall level of spending relative to a state’s budget.
5. Descriptive statistics for all variables are included in the 
Supplementary Online Appendix.
6. A brief discussion of model fit is provided in the 
Supplementary Online Appendix.
Figure 2. Effect of change in military expenditures on fatal 
militarized interstate dispute (MID) onset.
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